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The Tax System and Corporate Payout Policies
Nicholas Herold
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
Abstract
In this thesis, I examine how corporate taxes, dividend taxes, personal income taxes, and consumption taxes affect corporate
payout behaviour. Using rich international panel data that consist of 40,609 firms across 115 countries from 1999 to 2013,
I run linear regressions of each of the four tax rates on three payout variables which measure frequency and magnitude of
regular cash dividends distributed by firms. In my baseline model, I find that the predictions of the new view – one of the
two views in neoclassical theory – on short-run payout responses only partially hold true. Inconsistent with initial hypotheses,
corporate taxes on average do not impact a firm’s dividend payout behaviour in the short run. Regarding dividend taxes, my
results show that the hypothesised dividend tax neutrality only holds true for the relative amount of dividends but not for a
firm’s likelihood to distribute, increase, and initiate dividends. Consistent with initial hypotheses, personal income taxes and
consumption taxes trigger mostly large payout responses in terms of frequency and magnitude of dividend payouts. In my
two model extensions, in which I focus on payout behaviour of cash-rich firms and employ a more flexible definition of the
time horizon characterising short-run payout, my findings are again only partially in line with predictions of the new view on
short-run payout responses. With these results, this thesis not only analyses well-investigated tax rates – corporate taxes and
dividend taxes – for which current literature shows mixed empirical evidence but also examines hitherto scarcely considered
tax rates – personal income taxes and consumption taxes – in the neoclassical framework and determines their impact on
corporate payout.
Keywords: corporate payout; corporate tax; dividend tax; personal income tax; consumption tax
1. Introduction
Corporate payout policy is a fundamental part of corpo-
rate finance decisions besides deciding where to invest and
how to finance projects of a firm. Taxes, however, reduce
shareholders’ wealth on both the firm level (e.g., via corpo-
rate taxes) and shareholder level (e.g., via dividend taxes),
and thus likely distort payout decisions (Jacob and Jacob,
2013b). Hence, it is important for managers, shareholders,
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and policy makers to understand how taxes affect corporate
payout.
Previous literature has stipulated a variety of models
showing whether and how a change in certain taxes poten-
tially impacts payout decisions of firms. The most prominent
frameworks in tax literature are neoclassical models which
are typically divided into the old view (e.g., Harberger, 1962;
Poterba and Summers, 1984) and the new view (e.g., Auer-
bach, 1979; King, 1977) suggesting that payout behaviour
differs across firms due to different marginal sources of fi-
nance. Beyond neoclassical theories, agency models (e.g.,
Chetty and Saez, 2010; Jensen, 1986) provide an alternative
explanation of how firms are predicted to react to changes
in tax rates by considering the presence of agency issues.
Neoclassical and agency models, however, mainly focus on
corporate taxes and dividend taxes which both also con-
stitute the primary area of interest in empirical studies as
several tax reforms allowed a thorough examination of the
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5282/jums/v4i1pp63-80
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impact of corporate taxes1 and, in particular, dividend taxes
on corporate payout. In the setting of dividend tax cuts
in the U.S. in 2003 (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2005) and in
Sweden in 2006 (Jacob and Michaely, 2017), a variety of
studies support predictions of agency models2, but empirical
evidence on the neoclassical predictions remains heavily dis-
puted3. Tax research also discusses the impact of personal
income taxes on corporate payout, but the exact definition
varies strongly4 and rarely refers to taxes on labour income
in the context of dividends or share repurchases5. Regarding
consumption taxes, previous literature has hitherto solely
examined the effect on corporate investment (Jacob et al.,
2018) without considering the effect on corporate payout.
This is surprising given that, intuitively, corporate payout is
somehow related to the level of investment since managers
can either (i) immediately invest earnings in projects and dis-
tribute resulting profits in future periods or (ii) immediately
distribute earnings to shareholders or (iii) retain earnings
for future investments and payout.
Due to the different state of literature across tax rates,
this thesis aims at providing a comprehensive overview of
how a change in corporate taxes, dividend taxes, personal
income taxes, and consumption taxes affects payout deci-
sions of firms. Specifically, this thesis contributes to con-
temporary literature in two ways. First, it adds to the on-
going discussion about mixed empirical evidence on neoclas-
sical theories for well-researched tax rates (i.e., corporate
taxes, dividend taxes). Second, it bridges the current gap in
literature by embedding scarcely considered tax rates (i.e.,
personal income taxes, consumption taxes) in the neoclas-
sical frameworks and investigating their impact on corpo-
rate payout. To achieve this, I use international panel data
1In the context of corporate taxes, Poterba et al. (1987), for instance,
examines how the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the U.S. is predicted to lower
corporate savings and reduce tax incentives to retain earnings and distribute
dividends.
2These studies conclude that frictions such as agency issues (Chetty and
Saez, 2005, Jacob and Michaely, 2017) and shareholder conflicts (Jacob and
Michaely, 2017) reduce the responsiveness of corporate payout in case of a
dividend tax change.
3Chetty and Saez (2005) argue that listed U.S. firms responded to the
2003 dividend tax cut in accordance with the old view. By contrast, Brav
et al. (2008) conclude that the immediate payout response of these firms was
only temporary and that the dividend tax cut was of “second-order impor-
tance . . . [as only] firms ‘sitting on the fence’ [to initiate dividends]” (p.390)
were primarily affected.
4Wu (1996), for example, uses the term “personal taxes” (p.293) synony-
mously for dividend taxes in his empirical study on the payout behaviour
of listed U.S. firms. Likewise, Lewellen and Lewellen (2006) employ “per-
sonal tax rates on interest, dividends, and realized capital gains” (p.5) in
their single- and multi-period models when theorising how corporate pay-
out changes depending on the firm’s source of finance.
5In the context of private firms, Jacob and Michaely (2017), for instance,
argue that the taxation of labour income vis-à-vis dividends incentivises only
a specific group of owners to adjust the corporate payout of their firm due to
“strong empirical evidence that, with a limited number of owner[-managers
in closely-held corporations], there is strong substitutability between divi-
dends and wages (the other possible form of payout to owners in private
firms)” (p.3219). Other empirical studies also examine the sole impact of
personal income taxes whose scope, however, is mainly on macroeconomic
variables such as economic growth (Gale and Samwick, 2016; Palic´ et al.,
2017).
with focus on non-financial, non-utility, non-transportation,
and non-telecommunication firms across 115 countries over
the period 1999 to 2013 with sufficient variation in tax rate
changes. My estimation strategy involves three steps: (i)
Pre-analysis, (ii) baseline regression, and (iii) extensions to
the baseline model. Inspired by Jacob et al. (2018), the
pre-analysis is mainly based on a linear probability model to
rule out the concern that tax rate changes are determined by
macroeconomic factors. The baseline regression is the main
analysis in this thesis where I investigate the average effect on
corporate payout in the same year in which a change in one
of the four tax rates occurs. Consistent with previous studies
(e.g., Jacob and Jacob, 2013a), I measure payout, which is
defined as regular cash dividends due to insufficient data on
other payout channels, by three dependent variables cover-
ing frequency and relative amounts of dividends. Beyond the
baseline model, I also introduce two extensions which con-
sider heterogeneity in payout responses potentially caused by
different levels of cash holdings (e.g., Jacob and Michaely,
2017) and the impact of tax rate changes on payout one year
after a tax rate change occurs.
The results of my baseline regression show that the aver-
age payout response only partially follows neoclassical pre-
dictions on short-run payout responses as stipulated by the
new view. Inconsistent with initial expectations, corporate
taxes on average do not change a firm’s dividend payout be-
haviour in the year where a tax change becomes effective.
Similarly, the hypothesised “dividend tax neutrality” (Chetty
and Saez, 2010, p.5) only holds with respect to the rela-
tive amount of dividends. Vice versa, a change in dividend
taxes interestingly impacts a firm’s propensity to pay divi-
dends and likelihood to increase or initiate dividends in dif-
ferent directions (i.e., sign of coefficients differs) even though
the relative effect size is small. Personal income taxes show
mostly significant coefficients suggesting that a higher tax
rate increases the attractiveness of investments in corporate
projects such that firms invest more. Thus, they exhibit a
slightly lower propensity to pay dividends and distribute con-
siderably lower amounts in the short run. The results on con-
sumption taxes are fully in line with my initial hypotheses
implying that a rise in this tax rate increases the tax wedge
(Jacob et al., 2018) exerting pressure on profits of corpo-
rate projects such that firms invest less in the short run and
therefore distribute, increase, and initiate dividends more
frequently and pay higher relative amounts.
The baseline extensions reveal mostly similar findings.
Cash-rich firms appear to react more strongly compared to
the average payout response in terms of their likelihood to
increase or initiate dividends if personal income taxes, con-
sumption taxes, and (depending on the fixed effect) corpo-
rate taxes are changed. Although the payout response of
cash-rich firms is expected to match more closely short-run
predictions of the new view, the results do not fully confirm
this expectation and thus are again only partially in line with
predictions of neoclassical theory. When considering the pay-
out response one year after a tax rate change, corporate taxes
again do not appear to impact payout behaviour on average.
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Also, corporate payout is mostly not neutral to a change in
dividend taxes. Interestingly, the coefficient of personal in-
come taxes on a firm’s likelihood to increase or initiate div-
idends changes its sign suggesting that payout decisions in
subsequent periods are increasingly determined by the fact
that firms bear higher labour costs from an increase in this
tax rate. Regarding consumption taxes, the results are very
similar to the findings of the baseline model.
The remaining part of this thesis is divided into seven
further sections. Section 2 provides a profound theoretical
background on both neoclassical frameworks old view and
new view which I use as a foundation to formulate hypothe-
ses on how each of the four tax rates affects dividend payout.
Section 3 presents my methodology and displays descriptive
statistics on all variables of interest employed in the main
analysis. In section 4, I conduct my pre-analysis using the
linear probability model and test whether my dataset con-
tains sufficient variation in tax rate changes. Sections 5 and
6 show the results of my baseline regression and extensions
to the baseline model, respectively. In section 7, I test for
robustness of my baseline results. Finally, the conclusion of
this thesis is shown in section 8.
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Formulation
Even though various theories provide explanations on
how taxes might affect corporate payout decisions, empir-
ical studies mostly analyse their findings in the two neo-
classical frameworks: The old view (Feldstein, 1970; Har-
berger, 1962, Harberger, 1966; Poterba, 2004; Poterba and
Summers, 1984) and the new view (Auerbach, 1979; Auer-
bach and Hassett, 2003; Bradford, 1981; King, 1977). Con-
ceptually, these views differ in the underlying assumption
of how firms fund the additional project (i.e., what consti-
tutes a firm’s marginal source of finance). That is, the old
view assumes that firms finance new projects via new equity
whereas the new view is built on the idea that retained earn-
ings are used (see also Chetty and Saez, 2005). In the fol-
lowing, old view and new view will be incorporated into an
intuitive single-period model based on previous studies (Al-
stadsæter et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2013; Chetty and Saez,
2010; Lewellen and Lewellen, 2006) to illustrate the effect of
corporate taxes (τC), dividend taxes (τDiv), personal income
taxes (τI ), and consumption taxes (τVAT ) on corporate pay-
out decisions. Figure 1 visualises how an increase in each of
these tax variables impacts investors’ after-tax returns which,
in turn, changes investment and payout decisions. For sim-
plicity, my hypotheses are built on two assumptions. First, I
restrict corporate payout to regular cash dividends and ab-
stract from special dividends and share buybacks6. Second, I
6As discussed by Chetty and Saez (2005), firms have three payout chan-
nels: Regular cash dividends, special dividends, and share buybacks. I ex-
clude special dividends as they occur infrequently and are difficult to mea-
sure such that clear causal inference would not be possible. I also exclude
share buybacks since my dataset does not contain any information on this
payout channel. However, I acknowledge the increasing importance of share
use a highly stylised definition of τI in my hypothesis for-
mulation which involves both “personal taxes on interest”
(Lewellen and Lewellen, 2006, p.5) and personal taxes on
labour income7.
2.1. Old View and New View in the Single-Period Model
In the old view, the individual investor decides at the be-
ginning of period t whether to (i) invest in the firm’s project
by buying new equity or (ii) invest in an alternative invest-
ment opportunity which is for simplicity assumed to be a
risk-free bond (see also Alstadsæter et al., 2017). If the in-
vestor decides to invest $1 in a firm’s project (see arrow A in
Figure 1), the project will generate profits depicted by the
pre-tax rate of return, r. These profits are assumed to be
distributed in form of dividends in t+1 and are subject to
double taxation due to taxes levied on both the firm level
and the shareholder level (Jacob and Jacob, 2013b). On
the firm level, corporate taxes are levied on pre-tax project
earnings. Assuming that firms fully distribute their after-tax
profits as dividends at the beginning of period t+1, potential
payout $1[1+r] is effectively reduced to actual payout (i.e.,
gross dividends distributed by firms) $1[1+r(1- τC)] (arrow
B). On the shareholder level, these dividends are further re-
duced by dividend taxes finally yielding the after-tax divi-
dend income (i.e., net dividends received by shareholders)
$1[1+r(1- τC )(1-τDiv)] (arrow C). By contrast, the alter-
native investment in a risk-free bond generates an interest
payment denoted by the coupon rate, i, and is not subject
to double taxation. In this scenario, only personal income
taxes reduce pre-tax interest income $1[1+i] to the level of
after-tax interest income $1[1+i(1-τI )] (arrow D). Thus, the
rational investor will always invest in the firm’s project if and
only if the after-tax dividend income (arrow C) is larger than
after-tax income on the bond (arrow D). Hence, the investor
invests in the firm if pre-tax return on the firm’s project, r, at
least meets the individual investor’s minimum required rate
of return, r∗old , which is defined as the pre-tax rate of return
on the firm’s project where the investor is indifferent between
buying new equity and investing in the risk-free bond in t.
In the new view, the firm decides at the beginning of pe-
riod t whether to (i) invest in a profit-generating project and
buybacks as an alternative payout channel (Chetty and Saez, 2005; Von Eije
and Megginson, 2008). In this context, Jacob and Jacob (2013b) have
shown that the relative taxation of dividends vis-à-vis capital gains matters
for a firm’s payout channel choice. If capital gains are taxed at a higher rate
than dividends, firms would prefer distributing dividends over share buy-
backs and vice versa, as this yields a higher after-tax income for sharehold-
ers. Thus, share buybacks and the corresponding relative taxation should be
incorporated in future studies.
7This treatment is in line with the current tax code of the United States
(Office of the Law Revision Council, 2018). However, it does not hold for
other tax jurisdictions such as Germany where interest income (25% flat tax)
is presently taxed at a different rate compared to labour income (45% top
marginal income tax rate) (Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protec-
tion, 2017). In the empirical part of this thesis, I nonetheless try to interpret
my results using the hypothesised mechanism of my simplified single-period
model, but I also acknowledge that the definition of τI varies across coun-
tries and therefore add footnote 28 on this topic in section 5.
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Figure 1: Investment and Payout Decisions in the Old View and the New View
subsequently distribute dividends at the beginning of t+1 or
(ii) directly distribute its retained earnings at the beginning
of period t to shareholders who invest in a risk-free bond im-
mediately after receiving this dividend payment in t. Similar
to the old view, the project will generate a pre-tax return, r,
if the firm decides to invest $1 in the project, and r will be
again diminished by corporate taxes and dividend taxes (ar-
rows E and F) yielding the shareholder’s after-tax dividend
income $1[1+r(1- τC )(1-τDiv)] at the beginning of period
t+1. If the firm decides not to invest in its project, the divi-
dends distributed in period t are again subject to τDiv yield-
ing net dividends $1(1-τDiv) (arrow G). After investing these
net dividends in a risk-free bond, investors finally obtain
$1(1- τDiv )× [1+i(1-τI )] (arrow H). Assuming that firms
aim at maximising shareholders’ after-tax wealth, the firm
will invest in its project if and only if the shareholder’s after-
tax dividend income in t+1 (arrow F) is larger than the after-
tax income on the risk-free bond (arrow H). Likewise, r must
again at least meet the individual investor’s minimum re-
quired rate of return, r∗new, such that the firm invests in its
project instead of directly distributing dividends in period t.
2.2. Hypothesis Formulation
Based on this theoretical foundation, four hypotheses will
be outlined in the following. These hypotheses aim at ex-
plaining the potential effect of each of the four taxes on div-
idend payout in the light of both the old view and the new
view, and thus consider that the marginal source of finance
impacts dividend payout at different points in time: Firms in
the old view can only distribute dividends in period t+1 (i.e.,
they receive new equity in period t which they invest in new
projects generating profits and thus dividends of the next pe-
riod) whereas firms in the new view can decide whether to
distribute dividends in period t (i.e., immediate payout) or
pay dividends in period t+1 (i.e., from profits generated by
project investment in period t). A summary on the hypothe-
sised effects of an increase in taxes on dividends is shown in
Table 1.
Hypothesis 1: In t+1, an increase in corporate
taxes decreases dividends in both old view and
the new view. In t, an increase in corporate taxes
increases dividends in the new view.
If τC increases, firms for which new equity is the marginal
source of finance are expected to pay lower dividends in pe-
riod t+1 (Chetty and Saez, 2010). Ceteris paribus, higher
corporate taxes increase the individual investor’s minimum
required rate of return, r∗old , as investors demand a higher
pre-tax return on projects, r, to receive the same after-tax
dividend income as if taxes did not change. In other words,
investing in firms becomes less attractive relative to invest-
ing in a risk-free bond since the after-tax returns on the bond
(arrow D) remain unaffected; corporate after-tax earnings
(arrow B) and the shareholder’s after-tax dividend income
(arrow C), however, decrease. Thus, fewer projects can of-
fer an r that meets r∗old of investors such that more investors
decide not to buy new equity in period t. As investors invest
in fewer projects, firms generate lower profits, and therefore
dividend payout is expected to decrease in t+1.
If firms predominantly finance their projects via retained
earnings, an increase in τC is predicted to increase dividends
in period t but decrease dividends in period t+1 (Chetty and
Saez, 2010).
Similar to the old view, higher corporate taxes in the new
view increase r∗new while r itself remains unaffected. Thus,
firms are expected to distribute dividends in period t to max-
imise after-tax wealth of investors instead of investing in
profitable projects for which r is below the higher r∗new. Firms
will therefore invest in fewer projects leading to lower profits
for firms. This, in turn, results in lower dividends to be dis-
tributed in t+1. As firms, however, decide whether to invest
in corporate projects or directly pay out dividends to share-
holders in period t, a lower level of investments in t directly
corresponds to higher dividends in t.
Hypothesis 2: In t+1, an increase in dividend
taxes is expected to decrease dividends in the old
view while the new view predicts no change in
dividends in t and t+1.
In the old view, an increase in τDiv is expected to result
in lower dividends in t+1 (e.g., Jacob and Jacob, 2013b).
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Table 1: Effect of an Increase in Tax Rates on Corporate Payout
This table shows the effect of an increase in corporate taxes (column (1)), dividend taxes (column (2)), personal income taxes (column (3)), and consumption
taxes (column (4)) on a firm’s dividend payout in periods t and t+1 as predicted by the old view and the new view.
Increase in Tax Rate
τC τDiv τI τVAT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Old View t+1 ↓ Div ↓ Div Direct: ↑ Div ↓ Div
Indirect: ↓ Div
New View
t ↑ Div No Change Direct: ↓ Div ↑ Div
Indirect: ↑ Div
t+1 ↓ Div No Change Direct: ↑ Div ↓ Div
Indirect: ↓ Div
The line of argumentation is similar to the effect of τC on
dividends predicted by the old view: A rise in τDiv increases
r∗old , fewer projects with their given r will be able to satisfy the
higher r∗old , investors invest less in corporate projects, fewer
projects are realised, and firms generate lower profits result-
ing in a lower level of dividends in t+1.
The new view stipulates “dividend tax neutrality” (Chetty
and Saez, 2010, p.5) which implies that a rise in τDiv has
no effect on a firm’s dividend payout decision. If τDiv is in-
creased at the beginning of period t and remains at this new
level until the end of period t+1, net dividends received by
the investor in t (arrow G) or t+1 (arrow F) would be equally
reduced. Consequently, r∗new stays constant and the firm’s de-
cision to distribute dividends in t or invest in a project fol-
lowed by paying dividends in t+1 is not impacted at all. In
essence, the new view expects dividend payout in t and t+1
to remain unaffected if τDiv changes. This prediction is likely
to hold in the absence of agency issues and shareholder con-
flicts8.
Hypothesis 3: An increase in personal income
taxes reveals an ambiguous effect on corporate
payout in both old view (t+1) and new view (t,
t+1).
Irrespective of the marginal source of finance, an increase
in τI impacts dividend payouts in two ways. First, there is a
direct effect on the after-tax returns on the bond (old view:
arrow D; new view: arrow H). An increase inτI reduces these
after-tax returns such that investing in corporate projects be-
comes relatively more attractive for the investor (old view)
8For simplicity, I abstract from agency issues. However, I acknowledge
that governance plays an important role in corporate payout decisions. In
the setting of the 2003 dividend tax cut in the U.S., Chetty and Saez (2005)
show that agency issues shape payout responses as well-governed firms (i.e.,
firms with strong principals such as institutional investors with large share-
holdings) or agents whose interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests
(e.g., due to high executive share ownership) respond more strongly to a
tax cut in dividends. Likewise, Jacob and Michaely (2017) find that agency
issues and shareholder conflicts mute a firm’s payout response in the context
of the 2006 dividend tax cut in Sweden.
and the firm (new view). In other words, an increase in τI
reduces the investor’s minimum required rate of return, r∗old
and r∗new. Consequently, investors (old view) and firms (new
view) will invest more in corporate projects in t leading to
more projects being realised, and higher profits generated
by firms which, in turn, result in higher dividends in t+1 in
both old view and new view. The new view additionally pre-
dicts an effect on dividends in period t. More investments in
corporate projects in t automatically mean that less retained
earnings are available to be distributed in t. Hence, dividends
in t are expected to decline if τI increases.
Second, there is an indirect effect on the project pre-tax
returns, r, which are a function of τI . Intuitively, a rise in τI
increases labour costs of firms. Assuming that revenues gen-
erated by projects remain constant, this rise in labour costs
decreases r leading to lower after-tax earnings on the firm
level (old view: arrow B; new view: arrow E) and reduced
net dividends in t+1 (old view: arrow C; new view: arrow F).
Hence, fewer projects will be able to meet r∗old and r∗new such
that investors (old view) and firms (new view) invest less in
corporate projects in t resulting in lower profits and a lower
level of dividends in t+1 in both neoclassical models. Once
again, the new view additionally predicts an effect on divi-
dends in t. A lower level of investments in corporate projects
in t directly corresponds to more retained earnings which
can be distributed in period t. Thus, dividend payments in
t are expected to rise if τI increases. This hypothesis is likely
to hold if workers have a strong negotiation power vis-à-vis
firms, for example in the presence of strong unions, allowing
workers to shift part of the tax burden to firms (Alesina et al.,
2002).
Hypothesis 4: In t+1, an increase in consump-
tion taxes decreases dividends in both old view
and new view. In t, an increase in consumption
taxes increases dividends in the new view.
Similar to personal income taxes, consumption taxes have
an indirect effect on corporate payout. “Consumption taxes
drive a wedge between the price that consumers pay and the
price that producers receive. Hence, [the] firms’ profitability
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is expected to decrease when consumption taxes increase”
(Jacob et al., 2018, p.3). In other words, an increase in τVAT
lowers the pre-tax return on firms’ projects, r. Thus, fewer
projects are able to meet r∗old and r∗new such that investors (old
view) and firms (new view) invest less in corporate projects
in t. In t+1, this yields lower profits and therefore lower div-
idends according to both old view and new view. In addition,
the new view stipulates higher dividends in t as a lower level
of investment in corporate projects means that more retained
earnings will be distributed in t.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The majority of data used in my analysis was issued by
the WHU Chair of Business Taxation which, in turn, with-
drew these data from three main sources. First, firm-level
information on listed firms around the world over the period
1997 to 2013 was derived from the Compustat North Amer-
ica and Global database. Second, annual tax rates involv-
ing corporate taxes, dividend taxes, personal income taxes,
and consumption taxes were retrieved from tax handbooks
released by Ernst & Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers, and Deloitte. Third, country-level statistics comprising
macroeconomic variables, country governance indicators, in-
come group descriptions9, and region group classifications10
were extracted from the World Bank database.
After consolidating all data11, I converted each monetary
variable which was originally quoted in each firm’s local cur-
rency into USD using average annual exchange rates pro-
vided by the WHU Chair of Business Taxation. Subsequently,
I conducted general data cleaning by excluding firms with
SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-699912. The general data
9The original dataset provided by the WHU Chair of Business Taxation
contained some missing data entries on income group descriptions which,
however, were required to successfully change fixed effects in the robustness
section. Using World Bank data, I manually amended 15 income group de-
scriptions in total for Argentina, Jamaica, New Zealand, and Nigeria where
some country-years contained a missing entry. Please refer to the Excel file
WorldBank_Data_Income_History stored on the USB device for details on
the missing income group descriptions for these four countries. Further-
more, I retrieved the full historical income group dataset from the World
Bank database covering the period 1998 to 2013 for 66 countries like Esto-
nia, Saudi-Arabia, Taiwan, and Vietnam for which firm data already existed
but no information on income groups was present. Please refer to the Excel
file WorldBank_income_group_history_missing stored on the USB device for
details on the missing income group descriptions for these 66 countries.
10I extracted region names and region codes from the World Bank
database and added these data to the information provided by the WHU
Chair of Business Taxation. This step was required to cluster all countries in
my dataset by region and successfully make changes to the definition of my
fixed effects in the robustness section. Please refer to the Excel file World-
Bank_Data_Region_Codes stored on the USB device for detailed region in-
formation provided by the World Bank.
11The WHU Chair of Business Taxation additionally provided data on To-
bin’s q with high coverage across firms in my sample which I merged into
my dataset. The initially provided dataset revealed a poor coverage of Mar-
ket Value (i.e., market value of equity) and thus Tobin’s q. Other attempts
to generate Market Value via Common Shares Outstanding and Price Close
(i.e., market price per share) hardly increased the coverage.
12This treatment is similar to Chetty and Saez (2005) and Jacob and Ja-
cleaning was further complemented by dropping all obser-
vations which appeared illogical for my analysis in six steps.
First, I dropped observations for which there was no infor-
mation on total assets or when total assets were negative.
Second, I removed bankrupt firms (i.e., firms with a book
value of common equity equal to or lower than zero) from
my dataset. Third, I dropped firms with negative values
for cash and short-term investments, sales, and cash divi-
dends13. Fourth, firms with leverage values smaller than zero
and larger than or equal to one were excluded, too. Fifth,
I also removed observations with negative tax rates or tax
rates exceeding one. Sixth, I excluded negative values for the
macroeconomic variables GDP per Capita, Openness, Gov-
ernment Debt, and Interest Payments which, realistically, are
not smaller than zero.
Lastly, I winsorised my lagged firm controls and non-
dummy dependent variables below the 1st percentile and
above the 99th percentile of observations to mitigate biased
results caused by large outliers. After all adjustments, the
sample used for my baseline regression consists of 42,672
firms across 115 countries over the period 1997 to 201314.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all dependent vari-
ables, tax rates, firm-level variables, and country-level vari-
ables contained in this sample.
4. Pre-Analysis: Variation in Tax Rate Changes and Lin-
ear Probability Model
Prior to running a baseline regression, two major con-
cerns have to be addressed. First, the underlying sample has
to overcome the frequently objected “lack of compelling tax
variations” (Chetty and Saez, 2005, p. 792) to avoid a small
number of events potentially biasing my results. Otherwise,
it would be difficult to make a well-founded generalisation of
the impact of taxes on corporate payout. Second, all four tax
rates, which constitute the independent variables of my base-
line regression, have to be exogenous to conduct convincing
causal inference.
To address the first concern, the sample of my baseline
regression indeed contains sufficient variation in all four tax
rates. Across all 115 countries over the period 1999 to 2013,
there are 315 corporate tax changes (48 increases; 267 de-
creases), 144 dividend tax changes (72 increases; 72 de-
creases), 217 personal income tax changes (76 increases; 141
decreases), and 105 consumption tax changes (72 increases;
33 decreases).
cob (2013b) dropping financial firms (6000-6999) and utility firms (4900-
4999) because firms in these industries are subject to “additional regulations
and hence might have different payout behaviour” (Chetty and Saez, 2005,
p.798). I additionally excluded transportation and (tele-)communication
firms (4000-4899) since most of these firms are privatised companies which
are small in number but contribute disproportionately much to aggregate
dividends especially in the European Union (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008).
13Cash dividends refer to the variable Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) in my
consolidated dataset serving as a proxy for corporate payout.
14Since all tax rates start in 1999, my baseline sample effectively starts in
1999, too. Consequently, the number of firms used in my baseline regression
drops to 40,609 while the number of countries remains unchanged.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
This table is an overview of summary statistics of my main variables covering 42,672 firms across 115 countries over the period 1997 to 2013. Panel A shows
the three payout variables which are used as dependent variables in my baseline regression. Panel B presents the four tax variables of interest. Panel C and
Panel D depict firm-level and country-level controls, respectively. Please see table A.1 in the appendix for detailed definitions of all main variables. Note:
Summary statistics of Dividend Yield (t) in Panel A and all firm-level controls in Panel C are based on the winsorised version of the respective variables to
debias the mean.
Variable N Mean Standard 25th Median 75th
Deviation percentile percentile
Panel A: Payout Variables
Dividend Payer (t) 272,182 0.6584 0.4742 0 1 1
Dividend Increase (t) 224,464 0.2458 0.4305 0 0 0
Dividend Yield (t) 251,472 0.0087 0.0230 0.0000 0.0002 0.0052
Panel B: Tax Variables
Corporate Tax 345,995 0.3215 0.0742 0.2700 0.3300 0.3900
Dividend Tax 345,374 0.1965 0.1183 0.1000 0.2000 0.2643
Personal Income Tax 345,374 0.3973 0.0938 0.3500 0.4000 0.4641
Consumption Tax 325,902 0.1073 0.0627 0.0519 0.1000 0.1700
Panel C: Firm-level Controls
Leverage 369,79 0.0933 0.1564 0.0007 0.0112 0.1167
Cash Holdings (L. TA) 338,23 0.1270 0.2728 0.0020 0.0203 0.1130
Cash Flow 327,475 0.0110 0.1602 -0.0002 0.0029 0.0541
Profits 337,816 0.0267 0.2107 -0.0037 0.0517 0.1141
Retained Earnings 336,703 -0.2718 1.3584 -0.0032 0.0033 0.0581
Ln(Sales Growth) 323,767 0.0876 0.4336 -0.0460 0.0730 0.2182
Tobin’s q 279,478 1.5000 3.5913 0.3319 0.6838 1.4020
Firm Size 388,244 6.5550 3.0444 4.3861 6.3837 8.4699
Panel D: Country-level Controls
Macroeconomic Variables
Ln(GDP per Capita) 363,858 9.6126 1.3841 8.6600 10.4301 10.5557
GDP Growth 363,943 3.5811 3.4686 1.7292 3.1400 5.1472
Inflation 363,943 2.7069 4.3171 0.8477 2.0327 3.7157
Openness 304,225 0.7265 0.8648 0.2829 0.4831 0.6549
Deficit 269,554 -2.6677 3.9788 -4.8523 -3.1779 0.0177
Interest Payments 279,996 0.0225 0.0123 0.0150 0.0230 0.0276
Government Debt 196,656 60.9354 37.7064 40.0881 53.5029 64.0318
Governance Indicators
Voice and Accountability 371,063 0.6718 0.8952 0.3900 1.0100 1.3500
Political Stability 371,058 0.3317 0.8166 -0.2000 0.6000 0.9600
Government Effectiveness 371,047 1.1320 0.7665 0.4000 1.4600 1.7500
Regulatory Quality 371,047 0.9723 0.7836 0.4200 1.1900 1.6200
Rule of Law 371,063 0.9889 0.7968 0.2900 1.3300 1.6100
Control of Corruption 371,047 0.9796 0.9781 0.0500 1.2900 1.8350
To address the second concern, I employ a linear prob-
ability model inspired by Jacob et al. (2018) to determine
likely country-level correlates with the magnitude of tax rate
changes and ideally rule out issues “that tax policy is not
exogenously determined [sic] but related to changes in eco-
nomic conditions” (Jacob et al., 2018, p.15). Results of the
linear probability model are presented in Table 3.
Overall, changes in dividend taxes and personal income
taxes appear to be exogenous. Changes in corporate taxes
and consumption taxes, however, are likely to be influenced
by the macroeconomic factors GDP Growth and Ln(GDP per
Capita) and the factors GDP Growth and Deficit, respectively.
The significance of GDP Growth suggests that, based on my
dataset, policy makers tend to decrease (increase) corporate
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Table 3: Results of Linear Probability Model
This table presents how macroeconomic determinants of tax rates potentially affect the magnitude of a tax rate change in corporate taxes (column (1)),
dividend taxes (column (2)), personal income taxes (column (3)), and consumption taxes (column (4)). The definitions of all tax rates and macroeconomic
variables are outlined in the appendix in Table A.1. I include country fixed effects and region-year fixed effects in all four regressions. I report robust standard
errors clustered at the country level which are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Magnitude of Tax Rate Change in
Corporate Dividend Personal Income Consumption
Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP Growth -0.0006** -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Ln(GDP per Capita) 0.0258** -0.0353 0.0114 -0.0003
(0.0113) (0.0292) (0.0218) (0.0052)
Inflation -0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Deficit -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Openness 0.0089 0.0105 -0.0024 0.0037
(0.0072) (0.0215) (0.0187) (0.0036)
Interest Payments 0.1823 0.0757 0.1096 0.1045
(0.1348) (0.3864) (0.1674) (0.0632)
Observations 800 743 743 709
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 -0.072 -0.106 0.095
taxes and consumption taxes in periods where the economy is
in a boom phase (recession). Also, corporate taxes are likely
to be increased (decreased) if a country generates a higher
(lower) level of GDP per Capita implying that an economy
becomes more (less) productive and thus wealthier (poorer).
Consumption taxes are likely to rise (be reduced) if a coun-
try’s budget deficit increases (decreases). This result seems
to be reasonable as, intuitively, an increase in government
spending needs to be somehow financed; this finding, how-
ever, is not in line with the linear probability model results of
Jacob et al. (2018) despite using (almost) the same under-
lying dataset15. Across all tax rates, the variables Inflation,
Openness, and Interest Payments appear to be insignificant.
Based on these results, I include a GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP
per Capita) cluster in a fixed effect used in my baseline re-
gression16. This way, it is possible to account for poten-
tial endogeneity in tax rate changes and compare countries
which are economically similar in terms of GDP level and
GDP growth rates.
15Interestingly, my linear probability model results on consumption taxes
(column (4)) are based on 709 observations whereas Jacob et al. (2018)
rely on 664 observations.
16I deliberately excluded Deficit from the fixed effect because the lin-
ear probability model only proves marginal significance of this variable
(p=.091). This stands in stark contrast to GDP Growth (p=.024; p=.000)
and Ln(GDP per Capita) (p=.027). Thus, the significance of Deficit arguably
could have emerged by chance. Also, excluding Deficit is unlikely to ad-
versely affect my baseline results since it is correlated with the other two
macroeconomic variables incorporated in the fixed effect. Please refer to
the correlation matrix in 2.0_LPM_RESULTS_(EDITED) for further details.
5. Baseline Regression
To investigate the average effect of a tax rate change
on corporate payout, I stipulate the following linear regres-
sion model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation
method:
Payouti, j,t = α0 + β1CorporateTax j,t + β2DividendTax j,t
+ β3PersonalIncomeTax j,t + β4ConsumptionTax j,t
+δ1Φi, j,t−1 +δ2Γ j,t +αi +αg,k,t + εi, j,t
(1)
The dependent variable Payouti, j,t is a payout measure of
firm i headquartered in country j in year t. This payout mea-
sure is a placeholder for the three payout variables Dividend
Payer (t), Dividend Increase (t)17 and Dividend Yield (t)18
17Dividend Increase (t) covers a firm’s likelihood to substantially increase
(if a firm was a dividend payer in year t-1) or initiate dividends in year t
(if a firm was no dividend payer in year t-1). This variable is particularly
interesting as “against the background of the general stickiness of dividends
. . . , the decision to initiate or substantially increase dividends is a strong
commitment to a long stream of cash outlays (as opposed to a simple 1-
year commitment that can be easily reversed)” (Jacob and Jacob, 2013b,
p.1256). In my baseline regression, a substantial increase in dividends is
defined as an increase by at least 25%. This might be viewed as sufficiently
strict since the number of observations where firms pay dividends in year t-1
and increase them in year t drops from 90,546 to 48,002 while observations
covering initiations remain unaffected.
18Dividend Yield (t) is defined as the dividend-to-total-assets ratio similar
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based on previous literature (e.g., Jacob and Jacob, 2013a;
Alstadsæter et al., 2017). All variable definitions are pre-
sented in the appendix in Table A.1. In my baseline model, I
restrict all dependent variables to the time identifier (t) rep-
resenting year t (i.e., the year in which a change in taxes
first becomes effective) for two reasons. First, most firms are
likely to react quite fast to a change in taxes to maximise
profits and shareholder value. This assumption seems to be
reasonable as most tax rate changes are announced several
months or, in favourable cases, a year in advance prior to be-
coming effective. Second, Brav et al. (2008) have shown that
tax-related payout motives gain importance in the immediate
aftermath of a tax rate change but only play a minor role in
subsequent periods.
The independent variables of interest are the four tax
variables CorporateTax j,t , DividendTax j,t , PersonalIncomeTax j,t ,
and ConsumptionTax j,t . The baseline regression also in-
cludes two control vectors to account for alternative deter-
minants of corporate payout on the firm level and the country
level which are denoted by Φi, j,t−1 and Γ j,t , respectively. Con-
trol vector Φi, j,t−1 consists of the following eight firm-level
controls which are frequently used in literature19 (e.g., Jacob
and Jacob, 2013b): Leverage, Cash Holdings (L. TA), Cash
Flow, Profits, Retained Earnings, Tobin’s q, Sales Growth,
and Firm Size20. To rule out endogeneity concerns, I addi-
tionally lag each variable included in this vector by one year.
Control vector Γ j,t consists of nine country-level controls.
Inspired by Jacob et al. (2018), I included the three macroe-
conomic variables GDP Growth, Ln(GDP per Capita), and
Inflation21 besides the six governance indicators Voice and
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness,
to Alstadsæter et al. (2017). Due to poor coverage of market capitalisation,
conventional definitions such as “the dollar amount of dividends paid out
in year t+1 divided by the end-of-year t equity market value” (Jacob and
Jacob, 2013a, p.1251) are not used.
19My baseline regression does not include any proxy for ownership struc-
ture although previous literature has shown that it heavily impacts corporate
payout decisions as agency issues (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2005) and share-
holder conflicts might arise or be mitigated (Jacob and Michaely, 2017). Due
to lack of compelling data, however, I cannot proxy for ownership structure
(e.g., via percentage of closely held shares (Jacob and Jacob, 2013b)) which
may reduce the explanatory power of my model.
20Leverage considers that creditors in firms with a high debt-to-capital
ratio tend to urge these firms to refrain from distributing dividends (e.g.,
Jensen, 1986). Cash Holdings (L. TA) acknowledges that cash-rich firms,
intuitively, have more funds to be distributed to shareholders (e.g., Chetty
and Saez, 2010). I incorporate Cash Flow to capture the positive effect of
a company’s cash flow on dividends (e.g., Jacob and Jacob, 2013a) which
goes beyond considering pure cash holdings. Profits are a proxy for inter-
nal resources in addition to cash holdings (e.g., Jacob and Michaely, 2017).
Retained Earnings acknowledge that mature firms tend to have larger re-
tained earnings which are more likely to distribute dividends and pay larger
amounts (e.g., Jacob and Jacob, 2013b). Tobin’s q is “a proxy for stock un-
dervaluation and growth opportunities” (Jacob and Jacob, 2013b, p.1254)
and Sales Growth also measures growth opportunities (e.g., Alstadsæter
et al., 2017). Firm Size is used since larger firms, intuitively, have a higher
propensity to pay dividends and distribute larger amounts (e.g., Jacob and
Michaely, 2017).
21I exclude the remaining macroeconomic variables Openness, Deficit, In-
terest Payments, and Government Debt from my baseline regression due to
poor coverage which could potentially bias my results. Please refer to Table
1 showing that these four variables have a considerably lower coverage than
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption
in this control vector.
I employ two fixed effects in my baseline regression. First,
I use firm fixed effects, αi , to control for firm characteristics
which potentially impact payout decisions (e.g., firm age).
Second, I employ group-industry-year fixed effects, αg,k,t ,
where group (subscript g) refers to a GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP
per Capita) cluster. This cluster is additionally combined
with a specific industry k in year t to compare firms in the
same industry-year which also operate in economically sim-
ilar countries in terms of GDP level and GDP growth rates.
Finally, I use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors which
are clustered at the country level since firms headquartered
in country j are exposed to the same tax system.
Returning to the four hypotheses in section 2, my base-
line regression only allows a clear causal interpretation of
results with respect to the new view in period t because of
two reasons. First, periods t and t+1 in the single-period
model are a simplified theoretical abstraction where period
t models short-run effects (i.e., payout responses in year t
and year t+1) and period t+1 models long-run effects (i.e.,
payout responses in more distant future periods such as year
t+5). Long-run effects, in particular, are difficult to measure
since period t+1 might represent many years (e.g., ten years)
until old-view firms eventually start distributing dividends.
Similarly, it could take new-view firms a long time until they
show a payout response matching predictions of period t+1
assuming that no other tax rate change occurs in the mean-
time. Also, dividend payout in more distant future periods is
increasingly determined by confounding factors (e.g., a firm’s
financial performance and general economic developments).
Therefore, I measure payout in year t (baseline regression)
and year t+1 (second baseline extension) and thus restrict
the interpretation of my results to short-run responses match-
ing period t in the neoclassical models. Second, the sole con-
sideration of short-run responses, by definition, only allows
validation or rejection of new-view predictions in period t as
the old view does not predict any payout response in period
t (i.e., old-view firms receive new equity and thus cannot ad-
just their payout behaviour to a change in taxes in period
t). This argumentation is further supported when consider-
ing a typical old-view firm characterised by young age, high
growth rates, and financial constraints (Chetty and Saez,
2010) suggesting that they are less likely to distribute div-
idends in order to grow further. If these firms become more
mature, grow at lower rates, and have sufficiently high finan-
cial reserves, they are more likely to distribute dividends on a
regular basis22 (see also Sinn, 1991). Thus, even though my
sample likely consists of dividend-paying firms which might
GDP Growth, Ln(GDP per Capita), and Inflation. Nonetheless, I incorporate
Openness, Deficit, and Interest Payments into the vector Γ j,t as a robustness
test in section 7.
22Consistent with the model of Sinn (1991), I assume that old-view firms
transform into new-view firms over time. This assumption is supported by
DeAngelo et al. (2006, p. 227): “Consistent with a life-cycle theory of div-
idends, the fraction of publicly traded . . . firms that pay dividends is high
when retained earnings are a large portion of total equity (and of total as-
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exhibit some characteristics of old-view firms (e.g., financial
constraints), it is still reasonable to focus on the new view
when interpreting my baseline results.
Based on my initial hypotheses in the light of the new
view in period t, I derive the following four predictions.
First, I expect the coefficient of CorporateTax j,t to be signif-
icant and positive (i.e., β1 > 0) across all payout variables
as an increase in corporate taxes in year t exerts pressure
on firms which are financed via retained earnings to directly
distribute dividends in year t instead of investing in a project
whose after-tax returns, and thus dividends in future peri-
ods, decline from higher corporate taxes23. Second, I predict
the variable DividendTax j,t to be insignificant as implied by
the hypothesised “dividend tax neutrality” (Chetty and Saez,
2010, p.5). Third, the effect of a change in personal income
taxes on corporate payout depends on whether the direct ef-
fect or the indirect effect prevails. The direct effect predicts
lower (higher) dividends in year t in terms of probability
and magnitude due to higher (lower) attractiveness of in-
vesting in corporate projects compared to other investment
opportunities (e.g., bonds). Conversely, the indirect effect
forecasts higher (lower) dividends in year t due to higher
(lower) labour costs yielding a lower (higher) the relative
attractiveness of corporate projects. Thus, if the direct (in-
direct) effect dominates, I expect PersonalIncomeTax j,t to
have significant and negative (positive) coefficients across
all payout variables (i.e., direct: β3 < 0; indirect: β3 > 0).
Fourth, I predict the coefficients of ConsumptionTax j,t to be
significant and positive (i.e., β4 > 0) across all dependent
variables as a rise in consumption taxes increases the tax
wedge (Jacob et al., 2018) which reduces corporate invest-
ment. This, in turn, makes more retained earnings available
to be distributed as dividends in year t instead.
The compact version of my baseline results is shown in
Table 4. Columns (1), (2), and (3) (columns (4), (5), and
(6)) report the coefficients of each tax rate (the relative ef-
fect of a one-percentage-point increase in a tax rate) with re-
gard to the dependent variables Dividend Payer (t), Dividend
Increase (t), and Dividend Yield (t), respectively. A detailed
results overview of coefficients (standard errors) for all re-
gressors (i.e., including firm-level and country-level controls)
is shown in Table A.2 in the appendix.
Interestingly, the results of my baseline regression only
partially confirm my hypotheses based on the new view in
period t. On average, corporate taxes do not seem to im-
pact any payout variable due to insignificant coefficients in
all three columns. This suggests that firms do statistically not
sets) and falls to near zero when most equity is contributed rather than
earned.”
23This explanation assumes one of the two following conditions. First,
shareholders must be sufficiently strong to exert pressure on management
teams. As shown by Chetty and Saez (2005), this is the case for firms with
strong principals, i.e., large institutional investors such as pension funds and
independent directors are major shareholders. Second, firms in which their
management teams hold a high percentage of shares are more likely to act on
behalf of their shareholders as managers are major shareholders themselves
and thus benefit from higher dividends, too (Chetty and Saez, 2005).
respond to a change in corporate taxes which is not consis-
tent with the new view in period t. Although the insignificant
coefficients suggest that an effect is statistically not present,
it is surprising that the sign of all coefficients is negative and
not, as expected, positive. My hypothesis on corporate taxes
does not predict this outcome which I therefore recommend
examining in future studies.
According to my baseline regression, the hypothesised
“dividend tax neutrality” (Chetty and Saez, 2010, p.5) only
holds with regard to a firm’s relative amount of dividends24
due to an insignificant coefficient in column (3). With respect
to a firm’s propensity to pay and the likelihood to increase or
initiate dividends, dividend taxes seem to influence a firm’s
payout behaviour due to significant coefficients in columns
(1) and (2). Surprisingly, the direction of the effect (i.e., sign
of coefficient) differs between the dependent variables. In-
consistent with initial expectations, column (1) shows that a
rise in dividend taxes in year t by one percentage point (in
the following abbreviated as pp) increases the probability of a
firm distributing dividends in year t by 0.24pp25. The relative
effect, however, is comparatively small as a one-pp increase
in dividend taxes in year t increases the probability of a firm
paying dividends in year t by 0.36%26 relative to the average
probability of a firm paying dividends. Despite this small rel-
ative effect size, neither the new view nor empirical studies
evidencing a negative relation between dividend taxes and
a firm’s propensity to pay dividends (e.g., Chetty and Saez,
2005) support the positive coefficient in column (1). Thus,
the reason for this effect should be further investigated in fu-
ture studies. On the contrary, a rise in dividend taxes in year
t by one pp results in a lower likelihood to increase or initiate
dividends in year t by 0.25pp. This result is again not in line
with the new view but would be supported by the empirical
24This interpretation appears to depend on the observations in my sample
as the coefficient of DividendTax j,t in column (3) is only marginally not sig-
nificant (p=.109). Therefore, it is possible that a slightly different sample
composition could have shown significant results implying that the “divi-
dend tax neutrality” (Chetty and Saez, 2010, p.5) does not hold. In such a
scenario, the effect on Dividend Yield (t) would have a similar interpretation
as the effect on Dividend Payer (t) (see column (1)), but the relative effect
size of 1.02% is considerably larger given that Dividend Yield (t) is defined
as dividends divided by lagged total assets. Please refer to footnote 26 for
the relative effect calculation.
25Please note that all coefficients in Table 4 pertain to tax rates ranging
from 0 (i.e., 0%) to 1 (i.e., 100%) in my original dataset. For example, the
tax rate 0.30 for a specific country-year refers to a tax rate equal to 30%.
To interpret the coefficients as a one-pp increase in a tax rate (i.e., a tax
rate change by one unit equivalent to one pp), I mathematically transform
these tax rates into whole numbers ranging from 0 to 100 (i.e., I multi-
ply these tax rates by 100) and simultaneously divide the respective coeffi-
cients by 100. Hence, the coefficient 0.2389 (0.24 after rounding) turns into
0.002389 (0.0024). As my dependent variables are also defined between
0 (0%) and 1 (100%), I can interpret a one-pp increase in the corporate
tax rate (e.g., from 30% to 31%) as a change in my dependent variable by
0.2389pp (0.24pp).
26The relative effect is calculated by dividing 0.002389 (i.e., transformed
coefficient) by 0.6584 (i.e., the average value of the dependent variable;
please refer to Table 2 presenting summary statistics on all dependent vari-
ables). This yields 0.0036 or 0.36%. Please refer to the tab Relative Effect
Calculation in the Excel file 3.0_Baseline_Results_(Edited)_Final for all cal-
culations.
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Table 4: Results of Baseline Regression (incl. Relative Effects)
This table shows the compact version of the results of my baseline regression from 1999 to 2013. Additionally, the relative effect of a change in taxes on
each dependent variable is included in columns (4), (5), and (6). Relative effects are computed by dividing the coefficient of a tax variable by the mean of
the respective dependent variable. The dependent variables are Dividend Payer (t) (column (1) and (4)), Dividend Increase (t) (column (2) and (5)), and
Dividend Yield (t) (column (3) and (6)). All independent variables are defined in the appendix in Table A.1. I include firm fixed effects and gdp-cluster-
industry-year fixed effects in all three regressions. Please note that gdp-cluster is a placeholder representing a GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP per Capita) cluster. I
report robust standard errors clustered at the country level which are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. Please refer to Table A.2 in the appendix for a more detailed overview (including number of observations, adjusted R-Squared, etc.) of
my regression results. Note: The mean of Dividend Yield (t) is based on the winsorized version of the respective variable to avoid biased results due to the
presence of extreme values.
Coefficients Relative Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Tax -0.1549 -0.2884 -0.0154 -0.24% -1.17% -1.78%
(0.1821) (0.1872) (0.0166)
Dividend Tax 0.2389*** -0.2461** 0.0088 0.36% -1.00% 1.02%
(0.0655) (0.1213) (0.0054)
Personal Income Tax -0.3154*** -0.1049 -0.0543*** -0.48% -0.43% -6.27%
(0.1185) (0.0903) (0.0129)
Consumption Tax 1.2559* 1.8259*** 0.0883** 1.91% 7.43% 10.19%
(0.6998) (0.6860) (0.0420)
findings of Chetty and Saez (2005) showing that listed firms
increasingly initiated or increased dividends in the six quar-
ters following the dividend tax cut in the U.S. in 200327. Yet,
the relative effect size is again small: A one-pp increase in
dividend taxes merely reduces a firm’s likelihood of increas-
ing or initiating dividends in year t by 1.00% compared to
the average likelihood of increasing or initiating dividends.
Regarding personal income taxes, the direct effect on pay-
out appears to dominate the indirect effect with regard to a
firm’s propensity to pay dividends and the relative amount
of dividends due to negative and significant coefficients in
columns (1) and (3), respectively. Thus, firms appear to ac-
knowledge that an increase in personal income taxes makes
future dividends from corporate investments more attractive
for investors who would otherwise invest in less attractive in-
vestments such as bonds after receiving dividends in year t.
Therefore, firms invest more in year t, which, in turn, yields
lower dividends in year t28. To be more precise, a one-pp in-
27Chetty and Saez (2005), however, implicitly argue that the payout re-
sponse measured over these six quarters in 2003 and 2004 is sufficient to
validate long-run responses. Thus, they conclude that their results resemble
predictions of the old view. As outlined above, however, long-run payout
responses are technically difficult to measure in year t and year t+1. Hence,
I would be cautious when considering the conclusion of Chetty and Saez
(2005) and rather interpret my findings in the context of the new view in
period t.
28As mentioned in footnote 7, this interpretation assumes that firms and
investors are in a tax jurisdiction where labour income and interest income
are taxed at the same rate (e.g., the U.S.). Thus, my interpretation of the re-
sults at first glance seems to be vague when considering other countries.
However, regarding the disproportionately high percentage of dividend-
paying firms in my sample which are headquartered in the United States
(17,786 out of 166,084 and 159,721 observations), they might have vastly
contributed to this result due to major personal income tax changes in the
U.S. in 2003 and 2013. Yet, there might also be an alternative explanation
especially for other tax jurisdictions than the U.S. which I recommend ex-
amining in future studies.
crease in personal income taxes reduces a firm’s propensity
to pay dividends by 0.32pp and the amount of dividends dis-
tributed by 0.05pp of lagged total assets with small (i.e., neg-
ative 0.48%) and large (i.e., negative 6.27%) relative effect
sizes, respectively. Due to a negative but insignificant coef-
ficient in column (2), an increase in personal income taxes
in year t, however, reveals that neither the direct effect nor
the indirect effect eventually dominates in terms of a firm’s
likelihood to increase or initiate dividends in year t.
Due to significant coefficients in columns (1), (2), and
(3), consumption taxes seem to impact all payout variables.
Also, the direction of the effect is consistent with my hypoth-
esis as all coefficients are positive. For example, a one-pp
rise in consumption taxes yields a 1.26pp (1.83pp; 0.09pp)
increase in a firm’s propensity to pay dividends (likelihood to
increase or initiate dividends; amount of dividends relative to
lagged total assets). Also, columns (5) and (6) suggest that
the relative effect size of a change in consumption taxes is
moderately large (7.43%) and considerably large (10.19%)
compared to the average likelihood to increase or initiate div-
idends and the average relative amount of dividends, respec-
tively. By contrast, column (4) suggests that the relative ef-
fect size of a change in consumption taxes compared to the
average likelihood to pay dividends at all is moderately small
(1.91%). These results provide evidence that a rise in con-
sumption taxes increases the tax wedge which, in turn, re-
duces corporate investment. Thus, more retained earnings
are available to be distributed as dividends which results in
a higher probability to pay, increase or initiate, and a larger
relative amount of dividends distributed in year t.
To conclude, my hypotheses based on the new view in
period t are only partially confirmed29. My baseline results
mostly corroborate the neoclassical predictions on personal
29I also test for three alternative thresholds defining a substantial in-
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income taxes (i.e., direct effect mostly prevails) and con-
sumption taxes (i.e., positive and significant coefficients
across all payout variables). The neoclassical predictions on
corporate taxes and dividend taxes, however, are mostly not
supported by the baseline results. In the following, I there-
fore additionally test whether my hypotheses hold in the
context of (a) cash-rich firms and (b) dependent variables
with the new time identifier (t+1).
6. Extensions to the Baseline Model
6.1. Heterogeneity in Payout Responses due to Different Lev-
els of Cash Holdings
The first extension of my baseline model considers het-
erogeneity in payout responses arising from different levels
of cash holdings. As the average payout response only par-
tially confirms my initial hypotheses, I disentangle the aver-
age response and consider the payout behaviour of cash-rich
firms. According to neoclassical theory, cash-rich firms are
predicted to follow the new view because these firms have
sufficient cash holdings and retained earnings to finance new
projects or distribute dividends (Chetty and Saez, 2010). To
account for differences in cash holdings, I therefore define
the dummy variable High Cash which is equal to one if a firm
has a cash-to-total-assets ratio (Cash Holdings (TA)) larger
than the median value30 of this ratio in a given country-year.
Subsequently, I interact each tax variable with High Cash to
examine whether cash-rich firms exhibit a different payout
response compared to the average response of my baseline
regression.
I expect one of the two following outcomes to materialise.
First, the response of cash-rich firms could match predictions
of the new view in period t more closely than suggested by
the average response in my baseline regression. In this case,
I would expect the sign of the combined effect (i.e., average
effect plus marginal effect if firm is cash rich) of each tax
rate in this extension to have the same sign as the beta of the
respective tax rate as originally predicted for the baseline re-
gression. For instance, the combined effect of corporate taxes
on dividends is expected to be positive if a firm is cash rich,
i.e., the marginal effect is predicted to be positive and signifi-
cant offsetting the negative average effect. Second, cash-rich
crease for the variable Dividend Increase (t): 10%, 50%, and 100%.
When modifying this threshold, results are similar for DividendTax j,t and
PersonalIncomeTax j,t in significance and magnitude. Results on other tax
rates, however, vary depending on the specification. Please refer to the Excel
file 3.1_DivIncr(t)_THRESHOLDS_(EDITED) for detailed regression results
on all alternative threshold definitions.
30I define the median value by country-year instead of country-industry-
year to rule out a potentially incorrect High Cash classification of firms. For
example, firms operating in cash-rich industries would be classified as cash-
poor firms if they have lower cash holdings compared to their industry peers.
This would occur even though these below-median firms have significantly
larger cash holdings compared to firms in cash-poor industries. Hence, I ab-
stract from industry-specific differences in cash reserves and solely acknowl-
edge that cash holdings might vary across countries.
firms might simply react more strongly compared to the aver-
age response. That is, the sign of the interaction term coeffi-
cient is expected to be positive (negative) if the coefficient of
the average response shows a positive (negative) sign. The
latter expectation is based on the findings of Alstadsæter et al.
(2017) showing that cash-rich firms respond more strongly
to a tax cut in dividends. Building on this result, I extend the
scope of Alstadsæter et al. (2017) and include three further
tax rates.
Table 5 reports the results of my first baseline extension.
In column (2), the coefficients of the interaction terms31 sug-
gest that cash-rich firms react more strongly to a change in
personal income taxes and consumption taxes. In fact, cash-
rich firms exhibit an even higher and even lower likelihood
of increasing or initiating dividends if personal income taxes
and consumption taxes rise, respectively. To be more pre-
cise, cash-rich firms are 0.15pp less (0.16pp more) likely to
increase or initiate dividends if personal income taxes (con-
sumption taxes) increase by one pp which corresponds to
a total decrease (increase) in a firm’s likelihood to increase
or initiate dividends by 0.17pp (1.92 pp) if the firm is cash
rich. In relative terms, a change in personal income taxes
and consumption taxes implies that cash-rich firms respond
more strongly almost by factor 8 and by 9.08%32, respec-
tively. However, a firm’s propensity to pay dividends and the
relative amount of dividends do not vary with different levels
of cash holdings among firms.
From these results, I infer that the predictions of Alstad-
sæter et al. (2017) (i.e., my second expected outcome) con-
ceptually hold for personal income taxes and consumption
taxes with respect to a firm’s likelihood to increase or initiate
dividends. The expected stronger payout response of cash-
rich firms to a change in dividend taxes, however, cannot be
inferred from my results. Also, cash-rich firms do not ap-
pear to respond more strongly to changes in corporate taxes.
Furthermore, the stronger response of cash-rich firms in the
event of a change in personal income taxes (here: direct ef-
fect) and consumption taxes confirms my first expected out-
come, too. In other words, the combined effect (i.e., aver-
age effect plus marginal effect if firm is cash rich) of both
tax rates in this extension has the same sign as the beta of
the respective tax rate as originally predicted for the base-
line regression. This suggests that cash-rich firms as a proxy
31Please note that I only interpret the interaction effects since I am inter-
ested in whether cash-rich firms exhibit a different payout response com-
pared to the average response. Consequently, I disregard the average effects
in this regression as they are not examined by my research question in this
section.
32These numbers describe by how much more strongly cash-rich firms re-
act relative to the average effect. Therefore, I use the coefficients in col-
umn (2) of Table 5 and divide the combined effect (i.e., average effect plus
marginal effect if firm is cash rich) by the average effect and finally sub-
tract 1. A change in personal income taxes yields a stronger response of
cash-rich firms by factor 7.9319 or 793.19% (i.e., [((-0.1515) + (-0.0191))
/ (-0.0191) – 1] which is the same as the marginal effect dividend by the
average effect, i.e., [(-0.1515) / (-0.0191)] ). Similarly, a change in con-
sumption taxes causes a stronger response by 9.08% (i.e., 0.0908 = 0.1594
/ 1.7563 ) if the firm is cash rich.
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Table 5: Differences in Payout Behaviour due to Different Cash Holdings
This table displays the regression results showing whether different levels of cash holdings explain different payout responses between firms from 1999 to
2013. I define Dividend Payer (t) (column (1) and (4)), Dividend Increase (t) (column (2) and (5)), and Dividend Yield (t) (column (3) and (6)) as my
dependent variables. All independent variables are defined in the appendix in Table A.1. Additionally, I interact each tax rate with a dummy (High Cash)
equal to one if a firm has a cash-over-total-assets ratio (Cash Holdings (TA)) larger than the median in a given country-year. In columns (1), (2), and (3),
I include firm fixed effects and gdp-cluster-industry-year fixed effects. Please note that gdp-cluster is a placeholder representing a GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP per
Capita) cluster. In columns (4), (5), and (6), I include firm fixed effects and country-industry-year fixed effects. I report robust standard errors clustered at
the country level which are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Tax -0.1096 -0.2414 -0.0111
(0.1743) (0.1888) (0.0165)
Corporate Tax -0.0880 -0.0553 -0.0078 -0.0731 -0.0912** -0.0066
× High Cash (0.0807) (0.0535) (0.0049) (0.0857) (0.0431) (0.0047)
Dividend Tax 0.2632*** -0.2383* 0.0111**
(0.0672) (0.1241) (0.0053)
Dividend Tax -0.0472 -0.0127 -0.0044 -0.0483 -0.0169 -0.0045
× High Cash (0.0528) (0.0141) (0.0044) (0.0529) (0.0145) (0.0044)
Personal Income Tax -0.2852** -0.0191 -0.0539***
(0.1181) (0.0953) (0.0135)
Personal Income Tax -0.0463 -0.1515*** -0.0001 -0.0496 -0.1247*** -0.0009
× High Cash (0.0599) (0.0409) (0.0041) (0.0618) (0.0353) (0.0039)
Consumption Tax 1.2762* 1.7563** 0.0852**
(0.6956) (0.6766) (0.0415)
Consumption Tax -0.0685 0.1594** 0.0073 -0.0705 0.1424** 0.0072
× High Cash (0.0905) (0.0638) (0.0059) (0.0980) (0.0589) (0.0058)
Observations 178,161 168,309 178,161 177,275 167,454 177,275
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP-Cluster-Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Country-Industry-Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.789 0.161 0.683 0.794 0.171 0.693
for new-view firms respond even more clearly in accordance
with the new view in period t compared to the average re-
sponse. Contrarily, the insignificant interaction coefficients
of Corporate Tax and Dividend Tax with High Cash suggest
that cash-rich firms respond statistically as strong as other
firms to a change in these tax rates and thus do not corrob-
orate predictions of the new view. This finding is surprising
given that cash-rich firms in particular are predicted to fol-
low the new view. As neoclassical theory does not explain this
result, other factors might have contributed to this outcome
or the interaction with High Cash does not proxy new-view
firms sufficiently well.
The results are very similar if I choose different fixed ef-
fects to rule out the concern that unobservable characteristics
in a certain country, specific industry, and a given year ex-
plain my results. I therefore replace the GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP
per Capita)-cluster-industry-year fixed effect by country-
industry-year fixed effects in columns (4), (5), and (6) “to
absorb any previously omitted unobservable time-varying
characteristics at the [country-industry] level” (Jacob et al.,
2018, p.21). Similar to columns (1), (2), and (3), the level
of significance and the magnitude of the interaction coeffi-
cients remain mostly unchanged. The sole difference is that
the interaction of Corporate Tax and High Cash becomes
significant, too. Hence, I cannot fully rule out the concern
that “unobservable country-(industry)-year variables [are]
correlated with . . . [the] tax changes” (Jacob et al., 2018,
pp.21-22)33. Yet, the negative coefficient of Corporate Tax
and High Cash in column (5) is again not in line with predic-
tions of the new view in period t which could therefore be
an alley of future research.
6.2. Impact on Payout in Year t+1
The second extension of my baseline model considers the
effect of tax rate changes in year t on payout in year t+1
33Also, my results are not robust to different definitions of High Cash. I
define cash-rich firms in two alternative ways: Firms have a level of cash
holdings (Cash Holdings (TA)) such that they are in (a) the top tercile and
(b) the top quartile of cash holdings in a given country-year. Across both
alternative definitions, interaction terms which show significant coefficients
when using the median as the High Cash threshold are not significant any-
more (and vice versa). Also, the dependent variables which are impacted by
a tax rate change differ depending on the High Cash threshold. Changing
the fixed effects also reveals an unclear picture of whether cash-rich firms
react significantly differently than the average response. Thus, the effect of
taxes on the response of cash-rich firms remains unclear.
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Table 6: Results on Payout in Year t+1
This table presents the regression results showing how a change in taxes affects corporate payout in the year after a tax rate change (i.e., year t+1) from
1999 to 2013. I define Dividend Payer (t+1) (column (1)), Dividend Increase (t+1) (column (2)), and Dividend Yield (t+1) (column (3)) as my dependent
variables. All independent variables are defined in the appendix in Table A.1. I include firm fixed effects and gdp-cluster-industry-year fixed effects in all three
regressions. Please note that gdp-cluster is a placeholder representing a GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP per Capita) cluster. I report robust standard errors clustered at
the country level which are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Tax -0.1552 0.0925 -0.0084
(0.1464) (0.2794) (0.0104)
Dividend Tax 0.2296*** 0.0173 0.0164***
(0.0612) (0.1275) (0.0041)
Personal Income Tax -0.1693 0.5854*** -0.0330***
(0.1252) (0.1371) (0.0070)
Consumption Tax 1.1282* -0.0726 0.0861**
(0.5684) (0.8565) (0.0366)
Observations 142,493 137,004 142,493
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
GDP-Cluster-Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.805 0.150 0.709
assuming that tax rates in a certain country are not altered
every year (i.e., tax regimes are quite stable). Generally, in-
vestigating the impact on payout in year t+1 seems to be rea-
sonable as some firms might respond to a tax rate change
with a certain delay (i.e., not in year t already) which, for
example, might depend on how much in advance a tax rate
change is announced before becoming effective and how flex-
ibly individual firms are able to react. As outlined in section
5, dependent variables with time identifier (t+1) also cover
short-run payout responses and are therefore expected to be
in line with predictions of the new view in period t.
Table 6 reports the results of this second baseline exten-
sion. Interestingly, the results are quite similar to the ones
of the baseline model suggesting that a tax rate change in
year t does not only impact payout in year t but also has an
effect on payout in year t+1. For instance, a change in the
corporate tax rate on average again does not affect corporate
payout. Surprisingly, the coefficient in column (2) becomes
positive and the coefficient in column (3) converges to zero.
This matches predictions of the new view in period t more
closely than in the baseline regression but cannot be fully
corroborated due to insignificant coefficients. Furthermore,
the results of this extension confirm that an increase in divi-
dend taxes in year t on average yields a higher propensity to
pay dividends in the short run (i.e., in year t (baseline) and
year t+1 (extension 2)) as the coefficient of Dividend Tax in
year t+1 has a similar significance and magnitude as in year
t. Also, the coefficient in column (3) is positive but, unlike
in the baseline regression, highly significant suggesting that
a one-pp rise in dividend taxes in year t increases the relative
amount of dividends in year t+1 by 0.02pp of lagged total
assets. This implies that firms pay a larger relative amount
of dividends with a certain delay (i.e., in year t+1 (exten-
sion 2)) but not in the immediate aftermath of a change in
dividend taxes (i.e., year t (baseline)). The positive coeffi-
cient, however, again can neither be explained by the new
view nor by empirical studies evidencing a negative relation
between dividend taxes and payout and thus could be an al-
ley of future research. Contrary to the baseline results, the
positive but insignificant coefficient in column (2) suggests
that a change in dividend taxes on average does not change
a firm’s likelihood to increase or initiate dividends in year
t+1. This implies that a change in dividend taxes only has an
immediate impact (i.e., in year t (baseline)) on a firm’s like-
lihood to increase or initiate dividends. Thus, the effect of
Dividend Tax on Dividend Increase (t+1) is consistent with
the “dividend tax neutrality” (Chetty and Saez, 2010, p.5).
Regarding personal income taxes, the results in column
(1) and (2) differ from the baseline case. The coefficient in
column (1) remains positive but becomes insignificant sug-
gesting that the direct effect does not dominate the indirect
effect in terms of a firm’s propensity to pay dividends in year
t+1; in other words, the direct effect on the variable Dividend
Payer dominates the indirect effect only in the year when a
change in personal income taxes occurs (i.e., year t (base-
line)). Contrary to the baseline model, the indirect effect ap-
pears to prevail over the direct effect in column (2). Hence,
higher labour costs incurred due to higher personal income
taxes incentivise more firms to increase or initiate dividends
in the year after the tax rate change (i.e., year t+1) imply-
ing that investing in corporate projects becomes increasingly
unattractive compared to distributing dividends in year t+1.
Only the coefficient in column (3) is similar to the baseline
result: An increase in personal income taxes in year t yields
a lower relative amount of dividends in year t+1 which val-
idates the prevailing direct effect on the variable Dividend
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Yield in the short run (i.e., year t (baseline) and year t+1
(extension 2)).
Similar to the baseline results, a rise in consumption taxes
increases a firm’s propensity to pay and the relative amount
of dividends in year t+1, too, which is again in line with
the predictions of the new view in period t. This implies
that higher consumption taxes increase the relative attrac-
tiveness of directly distributing dividends in the short run
(i.e., in year t and year t+1) instead of investing in corporate
projects whose profit margins diminish due to the increased
tax wedge. By contrast, an increase in consumption taxes on
average yields no effect on a firm’s likelihood to increase or
initiate dividends in year t+1 (i.e., coefficient is insignificant
but, surprisingly, negative). Thus, firms only appear to ex-
hibit a higher likelihood to increase or initiate dividends in
the immediate aftermath of a tax rate change (i.e., in year t
(baseline)).
7. Robustness of Baseline Results
I test the robustness of my baseline results in two ways.
First, I change the specification of my fixed effects to test
whether my baseline results still hold when choosing alter-
native control groups. I therefore compare firms within
the same country-group-industry-year where each coun-
try is clustered by (a) geographic region (i.e., countries
are matched to one of the seven world regions defined
by the World Bank) and (b) income group (i.e., countries
are matched to one of the four income groups defined by
the World Bank) instead of grouping countries by economic
similarity in terms of the GDP level and GDP growth rate.
Hence, I replace GDP-growth-Ln(GDP per capita)-cluster-
industry-year fixed effects by (a) region-industry-year and
(b) income-group-industry-year fixed effects. Second, I in-
clude the three additional country-level variables Openness,
Deficit, and Interest Payments in control vector Γ j,t
34. This
allows me to rule out the concern that at least one of these
newly included variables is a significant determinant of a
firm’s payout behaviour (i.e., omitted variable bias occurs)
and that “nearly any desired result can be obtained” (Jacob
and Jacob, 2013b, p.1259) when selecting a different set of
control variables.
Table 7 presents the results of my baseline regression
when including alternative fixed effects. Clustering coun-
tries by geographic regions (columns (1) to (3)) and income
groups (columns (4) to (6)) mostly yields different results
compared to the baseline model. All coefficients either vary
in their magnitude or significance or both with the exception
of dividend taxes and personal income taxes in columns (1)
and (4) and columns (3) and (6), respectively. Surprisingly,
the coefficient of Corporate Tax is significant implying that
a rise in the corporate tax rate negatively impacts a firm’s
34Government Debt is still excluded due to substantially poorer coverage
of merely 196,656 observations compared to Openness, Deficit, and Interest
Payments with a coverage of 304,225, 269,554, and 279,996 observations,
respectively.
likelihood to increase or initiate dividends (clustered by re-
gion), relative amount of dividends (clustered by region),
and propensity to pay dividends in year t (clustered by in-
come). This finding stands in stark contrast to the results
of my baseline regression suggesting that corporate taxes do
not affect corporate payout. Despite clustering countries by
region, the coefficients of Dividend Tax are mostly similar to
the baseline model. Dividend Tax, however, shows different
coefficients in columns (5) and (6) if countries are grouped
by income. Regarding personal income taxes, income-group-
industry-year fixed effects reveal results which are mostly
similar to the baseline model whereas region-industry-year
fixed effects show a similar magnitude of coefficients in
columns (1) and (3) but a different significance of the coeffi-
cient in column (1). Interestingly, a change in consumption
taxes hardly plays a role in payout decisions when different
fixed effects are employed. Even though the magnitude of
coefficients in columns (3), (4), and (6) is comparable to the
baseline model, they are not significant in alternative speci-
fications. This finding stands in stark contrast to the baseline
results as this robustness test suggests that consumption
taxes do not affect payout.
Table 8 presents the results of my baseline regression
when including additional country-level variables in control
vector Γ j,t . The results of this model only partially resem-
ble the results of the baseline model. Consistent with the
baseline specification, an increase in consumption taxes pos-
itively impacts all payout variables while coefficients are sim-
ilarly significant with similar magnitude. Also, the effect of a
change in personal income taxes on Dividend Yield (t) is in
line with the baseline model due to a negative and highly sig-
nificant coefficient of similar magnitude. However, the coeffi-
cient of Personal Income Tax on Dividend Payer (t) becomes
insignificant and even slightly positive suggesting that per-
sonal income taxes do statistically not impact a firm’s propen-
sity to pay dividends which is not in line with my baseline re-
sults. Regarding dividend taxes, the results differ vastly from
my baseline regression as no coefficient is significant at all
with a negative sign across all payout variables. Even though
two coefficients of Corporate Tax in columns (1) and (2) be-
come positive, a change in corporate taxes does again not
impact corporate payout which is consistent with my base-
line model.
Overall, the majority of baseline results are not robust to
the inclusion of different fixed effects and additional country-
level controls. The only result appearing to be fully robust to
alternative regression specifications is the coefficient of Per-
sonal Income Tax on Dividend Yield (t) which, in most cases,
is highly significant with a similar magnitude as in the base-
line model. By contrast, the effect of other tax variables on
payout highly depends on the specification and thus, I derive
the following two conclusions. First, the choice of the fixed
effect is critical. Second, I cannot rule out the fact that my
baseline model might suffer from omitted variable bias even
though the low coverage of newly included variables reduces
the number of observations by one quarter compared to the
baseline model.
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Table 7: Robustness of Main Results to Different Fixed Effects
This table shows the results of my baseline regression from 1999 to 2013 when employing different fixed effects. I replace gdp-cluster-industry-year fixed
effects by region-industry-year fixed effects and income-group-industry-year fixed effects in columns (1) to (3) and columns (4) to (6), respectively. Both
region and income-group follow definitions provided by the World Bank. The dependent variables are Dividend Payer (t) (column (1) and (4)), Dividend
Increase (t) (column (2) and (5)), and Dividend Yield (t) (column (3) and (6)). All independent variables are defined in the appendix in Table A.1. I report
robust standard errors clustered at the country level which are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Tax -0.3664 -0.4609*** -0.0205* -0.4678** 0.0514 -0.0164
(0.2219) (0.1519) (0.0120) (0.1857) (0.2342) (0.0149)
Dividend Tax 0.2127*** -0.2738*** 0.0049 0.2126*** -0.0794 0.0144***
(0.0637) (0.0745) (0.0046) (0.0606) (0.0702) (0.0040)
Personal Income Tax -0.3613 0.1851 -0.0437** -0.4662*** 0.3108 -0.0499***
(0.2204) (0.1154) (0.0167) (0.1535) (0.2139) (0.0141)
Consumption Tax 0.7412 0.9547 0.0762 1.2320 1.4067* 0.0760
(0.8597) (0.6903) (0.0494) (0.9408) (0.7678) (0.0635)
Observations 166,133 159,769 166,133 166,131 159,770 166,131
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GDP-Cluster-Industry-Year FE No No No No No No
Region-Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Income-Group-Industry-Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.795 0.160 0.697 0.794 0.154 0.694
Table 8: Robustness of Main Results to Additional Country-level Controls
This table shows the results of my baseline regression from 1999 to 2013 when employing additional country-level variables in control vector Γ j,t . I additionally
include variables Openness, Deficit, and Interest Payments. Variable Government Debt is still omitted due to poor coverage. The dependent variables are
Dividend Payer (t) (column (1) and (4)), Dividend Increase (t) (column (2) and (5)), and Dividend Yield (t) (column (3) and (6)). All independent variables
are defined in the appendix in Table A.1. I include firm fixed effects and gdp-cluster-industry-year fixed effects in all three regressions. Please note that
gdp-cluster is a placeholder representing a GDP-Growth-Ln(GDP per Capita) cluster. I report robust standard errors clustered at the country level which are
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Corporate Tax -0.1404 -0.2452 -0.0157
(0.1696) (0.1833) (0.0165)
Dividend Tax 0.2468*** -0.2299** 0.0084
(0.0654) (0.1103) (0.0056)
Personal Income Tax -0.2838** -0.1406 -0.0533***
(0.1136) (0.0982) (0.0131)
Consumption Tax 1.0857 1.8513*** 0.0797**
(0.6712) (0.6872) (0.0391)
Observations 158,184 152,337 158,184
Controls Yes Yes Yes
GDP-Cluster-Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.799 0.164 0.703
8. Conclusion
This thesis examines the effect of corporate taxes, divi-
dend taxes, personal income taxes, and consumption taxes
on corporate payout. For this, I use a cross-country panel
consisting of 115 countries over the period 1999 to 2013
and run linear regressions of the four taxes on three depen-
dent variables measuring dividend payout. The results of the
baseline regression and subsequent extensions only partially
confirm the predictions of the new view on short-run payout
responses (i.e., responses in period t in the simplified single-
period model). Inconsistent with initial hypotheses, corpo-
rate taxes on average do not impact dividend payout in the
same year when a tax rate change becomes effective in terms
of frequency and relative amounts, but a change in dividend
taxes yields a statistically significant payout response even
though the magnitude is small and the direction of the ef-
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fect depends on the payout variable. Consistent with initial
expectations, changes in personal income taxes (here: direct
effect) and consumption taxes trigger mostly large payout
responses. Also, cash-rich firms respond more strongly to
a change in personal income taxes, consumption taxes, and
(only on the country-industry level) corporate taxes. The re-
sults on payout one year after a tax rate change are mostly
similar to the baseline model.
The analysis of this thesis, however, is limited to only
one aspect of corporate payout (i.e., dividends) and only one
part of neoclassical theory (i.e., new view in period t). In
order to draw clear policy recommendations, it is therefore
imperative to adopt a more holistic view by extending the
scope of this thesis and investigating alternative explanations
for the findings which are not in line with neoclassical the-
ory. One way of achieving this could involve the analysis
of total payout (i.e., share repurchases plus dividends; see
also Chetty and Saez, 2005) since (i) share repurchases have
gained importance over the last decades in the U.S. and Eu-
rope (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008) and (ii) share repur-
chases and dividends are, to a certain extent, interchange-
able payout channels implying that a tax rate change might
lead to dividends being substituted by share repurchases and
vice versa (Chetty and Saez, 2005). In this context, the
relative taxation of dividends vis-à-vis capital gains has to
be considered, too (see also Jacob and Jacob, 2013a). An-
other way of deriving holistic implications involves the con-
sideration of agency models (e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2010)
which might also explain some deviations of the regression
results from neoclassical predictions. Thus, I would recom-
mend incorporating ownership structure or alternative prox-
ies for shareholder conflicts (Jacob and Michaely, 2017) and
agency issues (Chetty and Saez, 2005; Jacob and Michaely,
2017) into the regression model. Signalling models (e.g.,
Gordon and Dietz, 2006) could be taken into account, too, for
which many executives would have to be interviewed to test
whether a payout response deviating from neoclassical pre-
dictions might be interpreted as a “signal of managerial con-
fidence in future earnings” (Jacob and Jacob, 2013a, p.188).
Finally, it is possible that firms anticipated a change in taxes
in previous periods such that the response in year t rather
matches the predictions of the new view in period t+1 and is
therefore a question worth being pursued in future research.
Overall, the results of this thesis should be regarded as
a starting point and give managers, shareholders, and pol-
icy makers a first impression of how taxes impact corporate
payout decisions which are, nonetheless, still to be comple-
mented by future research.
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